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Summary
The National Security Agency (NSA), one of the largest components of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, has reached a major watershed in its history.  Responsible
for obtaining intelligence from international communications, NSA’s efforts are being
challenged by the multiplicity of new types of communications links, by the
widespread availability of low-cost encryption systems, and by changes in the
international environment in which dangerous security threats can come from small,
but well organized, terrorist groups as well as hostile nation states.
NSA’s efforts to adjust to the changing geopolitical and technological
environment have been strongly encouraged by Congress and reflect a major shift in
congressional oversight of the Agency.  Although Congress has always approved
funding for NSA, for decades routine oversight was limited to a few Members and
staff.  In the 1970s, congressional investigations of intelligence agencies resulted in
greater public attention to NSA and criticism of activities that infringed on the civil
liberties of U.S. persons.  Subsequently, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives established intelligence oversight committees that have closely
monitored NSA’s operations.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was
enacted in 1978 to regulate collection by foreign intelligence agencies of the
communications of U.S. persons.  The end of the Cold War, the expansion of low-
cost encryption and the explosion of communications systems led Congress to take
a more public profile in overseeing the large and secretive Agency.
Reacting in large measure to congressional concerns, NSA launched two
separate management reviews, one by outside experts, the other by longtime Agency
officials. Both made strong criticisms of Agency personnel policies, an outmoded
organizational structure, and an unwillingness to utilize civilian practices that more
effective than those available in-house.  The current NSA Director, Lt. General
Michael V. Hayden, USAF, has used these analyses to launch a series of major
initiatives designed to improve NSA’s operations, to attract and reward more
qualified people from outside industry, and is developing a major contract for outside
support of its non-sensitive Information Technology (IT) functions.
A major renewal effort is underway, but observers believe many challenges lie
ahead that will require congressional oversight.  Many of the reforms in personnel
policies recommended are difficult to implement in a government organization,
especially in an extremely tight market for technical specialists.  The technical
complexities of dealing with widespread and sophisticated encryption as well as the
proliferation of communications devices remain to be resolved.  NSA is, along with
other intelligence agencies, not well-positioned to analyze developments among the
assortment of terrorist groups and narcotics smugglers around the world that can
seriously affect U.S. interests.  NSA has also come under heated criticism in the
European Parliament for allegedly collecting, in cooperation with the British,
commercial intelligence to benefit U.S. corporations.  
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1 A primary responsibility of NSA is the collection and analysis of signals intelligence a
function that has been described by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet as “one of
the pillars of US intelligence.  Along with our other intelligence collection activities, we rely
on SIGINT to collect information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers,
organizations, and persons to support the foreign policy and other national interests fo the
United States.  SIGINT is critical to monitoring terrorist activities, arms control compliance,
narcotics trafficking, and the development of chemical and biological weapons and weapons
of mass destruction.”  Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2000. NSA is also
responsible for protecting information systems security of U.S. Government agencies.  This
is an increasingly important NSA mission that includes the preparation of codes and encoding
devices, but the focus of this report will be on the more controversial intelligence collection
and analysis mission.  
The National Security Agency:
Issues for Congress
Introduction
The National Security Agency (NSA), one of the largest components of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, has reached a major watershed in its history.  Responsible
for obtaining intelligence from international communications,1 NSA’s efforts are being
challenged by the multiplicity of new types of communications links, by the
widespread availability of low-cost encryption systems, and by changes in the
international environment in which dangerous security threats can come from small,
but well organized, terrorist groups as well as hostile nation states.
NSA was established in 1952 as a highly compartmented secret codebreaking
effort undertaken by a handful of military officers and civilians, but the Agency has
gradually become an acknowledged government agency responsible for signals
intelligence (sigint).  This evolution has been in significant measure a result of
congressional initiatives.  Congress provided the statutory framework for NSA and
its activities.  Laws have been enacted that carefully prescribe the limits of NSA’s
electronic surveillance of U.S. persons. Congress has been increasingly inclined to
take public notice of problems at NSA and is supporting reforms that are designed to
make NSA more effective in current technological and geopolitical environments.
The challenges facing NSA are formidable; a difficult operational environment
as well as limitations on spending levels for intelligence call into question the future
capabilities of NSA.  Public interest in NSA has been heightened in recent months by
some members of the European Parliament who allege that the United States and a
few other countries are cooperatively engaged in systematic electronic eavesdropping
in order to promote the commercial interests of U.S. corporations.  This Report will
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attempt to provide an unclassified description of NSA’s evolution, the technical and
operational environment that now exists, and indicate some issues that the executive
branch and Congress will be facing in coming years.
An unmistakable change affecting NSA has been the openness with which its
policies and problems are now discussed both by the Agency’s leadership and by
congressional oversight committees.  Until very recently NSA was the most secretive
intelligence agency, more shielded from public scrutiny than the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).   Only the most elliptical references were made in public to the sigint
mission, and at one time, NSA employees identified themselves only as working for
the Defense Department.  In the past few years, however, senior intelligence officials
frequently describe NSA’s problems and reports accompanying intelligence legislation
include extensive commentary on the challenges facing NSA and the approaches
encouraged by Congress.  These changes were made possible by the absence of a
superpower competitor capable of exploiting any inadvertent security slip and by the
need to justify intelligence spending at a time when international climate is apparently
more benign.  These factors removed inhibitions against NSA “going public” and, at
the same time, created a political environment that would require public understanding
of NSA’s mission if the Agency could continue to obtain the funding necessary to
update its operations.
Roles and Missions:  The Growing Influence of Congress
 
For decades Congress was content to consider the signals intelligence effort and
the organization of NSA primarily as the responsibility of the executive branch. For
a quarter century after the end of the Second World War, NSA and the nation’s other
intelligence agencies undertook their activities with little publicity and with
congressional interest limited to a handful of members of armed services and
appropriations committees.  The intelligence investigations of the 1970s, however, led
to well-publicized hearings that placed many secrets, including those of NSA, on the
public record.  Of greater enduring significance was the establishment of select
intelligence committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  These
committees were granted the authority to conduct oversight over the intelligence
activities of the Federal Government, including NSA.  They became, along with the
appropriations committees, the points of contact between the intelligence agencies
and Congress.  As a result of the extreme sensitivity of much intelligence information,
the two intelligence committees came to act essentially as surrogates for the Congress
and the public in regard to intelligence agencies.  Until the mid-1990s much of interest
of the committees, as reflected in report language and public hearings, centered on the
CIA and especially its operations directorate.  Sigint activities were undoubtedly
matters of congressional concern, but they were very rarely the focus of public
attention.2
In recent years, with the end of the Cold War the two intelligence committees
have had much more intensive concern with NSA as reflected in more detailed report
language on NSA’s activities.   The extent of oversight is reflected by comments in
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130, Part 1, May 7, 1999, p. 12.
4 Linda Blake and Jim Lande, Trends in the U.S. International Telecommunications Industry
(Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1999), tables 7,9.
the report on the FY2000 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 1555) by the House
intelligence committee:
In the last two Congresses, the committee has been direct in its identification of
process and management problems that require attention.  The committee believes
that NSA management has not yet stepped up to the line.  There have been some
efforts at reform, but there are still several areas where change is not only needed
but is critical for NSA’s future.3
Congress has taken a more open interest in NSA at a time when the Agency’s
roles and missions are facing significant reformulation.  Congress has provided
guidance for NSA’s future direction and has made budgetary allocations based on its
sense of appropriate goals, personnel policies, and organizational structure.  Most
observers believe, moreover, that, given the fluid state of international affairs and
information technologies, that further congressional attention is likely as NSA changes
to adapt to its new environment.  
Changing Technologies
The primary targets of electronic surveillance during the Cold War were the
communications of hostile military organizations and governments.  Most of such
communications were encrypted; in many cases this message traffic could be read only
sporadically, if at all (although useful information can often be obtained without
actually reading the actual messages).  Some communications were carried on land
lines that could be intercepted only if they could be physically tapped, inevitably a
difficult undertaking.  It was, nonetheless, the government and military circuits that
provided the most important intelligence of military capabilities, hostile intentions, and
diplomatic maneuvers that could place this nation’s security at risk.  Civilian
communications–telegraphs, telephones, facsimile devices, etc.–were usually
unencrypted and often sources of valuable information, albeit of secondary priority.
In the past decade, two important trends have combined to change the nature of
electronic surveillance efforts.  The end of the Cold War meant policymakers and
military officials had a wider range of countries that they were concerned with and
placed much greater emphasis on “non-state actors”–terrorist groups and narcotics
smuggling organizations that have come to be seen as genuine national security
threats. These links are not necessarily easy targets given the great expansion in
international telephone service that has grown by approximately 18% annually since
1992.  Intelligence agencies are faced with profound “needle- in-a-haystack”
challenges; it being estimated that in 1997 there were some 82 billion minutes of
telephone service worldwide.4
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The technologies used in civilian communications circuits have also changed; in
the past decade reliance on microwave transmissions (which can be intercepted with
relative efficiency) has been increasingly displaced by fiber optic cables.5  Fiber optics
can carry far more circuits with greater clarity and through longer distances and
provides the greater bandwidth necessary for transmitting the enormous quantities of
data commonplace in the Internet age.  Inevitably, fiber optic transmission present
major challenges to electronic surveillance efforts as their contents cannot be readily
intercepted, at least without direct access to the cables themselves.  The widespread
use of fiber optics may also affect requirements for expensive sigint satellites since
transmissions over fiber optic cables cannot be intercepted from space-based
platforms.6
In addition to the widespread use of fiber optic cable, civilian communications
have been marked by increased access to high-quality encryption systems formerly
available only to governments and militaries.  Some systems are available at no cost
on the Internet and others can be obtained commercially at minimal expense.  This has
led to an extensive  debate in the United States about the need for export controls on
sophisticated encryption systems.  Although it is universally acknowledged that
commercial encryption systems available throughout the world present major
challenges to intelligence (and law enforcement) agencies, U.S. intelligence officials
have argued that permitting export of high-quality U.S. systems with associated
systems support would greatly extend the capabilities of other governments and
hostile groups to protect their communications. After extensive discussions within the
executive branch and Congress, steps have been taken to loosen, but not remove, U.S.
restrictions on encryption exports.7  NSA officials were active in criticizing
unrestricted encryption exports and observers suggest that these views, which were
shared by many in Congress especially within the intelligence and armed services
committees, may have fueled press criticism of NSA.
Changing threats, coupled with the evolving global technological environment,
have undoubtedly made NSA’s tasks far more difficult.  The proliferation of
communications throughout the world and the spread of encryption may make
electronic surveillance almost impossible.  Much equipment acquired for Cold War
missions is not effective against new targets.  In some cases, NSA must resort to
analyses of traffic patterns–who is communicating with whom, when, and how
often–to provide information that may not be obtainable through breaking of codes
and reading of plaintext.  
A major shortcoming was revealed in January 2000 when a software anomaly in
the communications infrastructure curtailed NSA’s operations for some 72 hours.  An
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reportedly helped to supply data that NSA could not obtain directly; see Ben MacIntyre, “UK
Spied for US as Computer Bug Hit,” Times (London), April 27, 2000.
9 Statement of Vice Admiral J.M. McConnell, USN, Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service in U.S. Congress, 103rd Congress, 1st session, House
of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Cental Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency: Minority Hire, Retentions and
Promotions, Hearing, October 28, 1993, p. 27. 
intensive and expensive effort was required to restore operations.  A subsequent
assessment found that the fundamental problem was not technical, but doctrinal and
organizational.8
Personnel Matters
NSA has employed many highly gifted scientists, engineers, and mathematicians.
However, shifting geopolitical concerns and budget reductions required in the early
1990's led to early retirements and fewer newly hired employees.  During the same
period, the Agency was also required to move towards a personnel structure more
closely reflective of national demographics.  Simultaneously, a revolution in
communications and information technologies was launched in many small, start-up
firms whose culture and salary and personnel benefit levels were radically different
from those of government agencies.  As the extent of these problems became
apparent, Congress has provided guidance in several areas.
Diversity and Equal Opportunity Issues
At least since the enactment of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 NSA’s
personnel policies have been the subject of congressional interest.  That Act in essence
established a separate personnel system for NSA.   By the mid-1980s the House
Intelligence Committee became concerned with the relatively small numbers of
African-Americans, Hispanics, and women within the NSA workforce.  (In 1993,
blacks constituted 9% of the total number of NSA employees whereas the national
labor force percentage was just over 10; the NSA Hispanic percentage was 1.2,
whereas the national average was just over 8; for Asian Americans, the national figure
was 2.9, at NSA it was 0.9.)9  One congressional initiative included provisions in the
FY1987 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L.99-569) amending the National Security
Agency Act to establish an undergraduate training program to facilitate the
recruitment of minority high school students with skills in mathematics, computer
sciences, engineering and foreign languages. Recruitment efforts were made in
colleges with higher concentrations of Hispanic students and efforts were made to
ensure equal consideration in promotions.  By 1996, NSA had made measurable
increases in minority and female representation in the general workforce and in
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achievement.  See “NSA Chief Pushes Ahead with Overhaul of Agency’s Culture,
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leadership positions.10  These initiatives were not welcomed by all NSA personnel,
with some officials expressing concerns that others would receive preference at their
own expense.11   Since the mid-1990s public congressional hearings and published
committee reports have not given extensive discussion to diversity issues. Although
efforts continue to increase the diversity of NSA’s workforce, other personnel issues
have complicated hiring and promotion policies.
Changing Personnel Requirements
Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of sigint targets has changed; the sheer
quantity of communications has dramatically risen and sophisticated encryption
systems are increasingly available throughout the world.  These changes in targets and
technologies have required a substantially different NSA workforce.  Long staffed by
civil servants and military personnel who made their whole careers in cryptologic
specialities; NSA officials must now be able to shift rapidly among disparate sigint
efforts and varying targets.  Different skill mixes are required at NSA at a time when
technical specialists in communications, computer services, and encryption systems
are in high demand throughout the economy.  Observers believe that entry- and mid-
level government salaries are not equal to opportunities currently available in an
especially dynamic sector of the economy; furthermore, workers in technical fields
often shift jobs in short periods and it may not be possible to retain them solely on the
basis of the career benefits of federal service.12 
As has been the case with other intelligence agencies, staffing levels at NSA have
been reduced during the past decade.  Many analysts and others who spent their
careers focusing on Soviet and Warsaw Pact issues no longer directly relevant to U.S.
security concerns have retired or moved into new specialities.  Some media observers
suggest, however, that NSA continues to be burdened by an “old guard” of Cold
War-era careerists whose talents are not precisely suitable to emerging missions.
Although such charges are difficult to document (and may only reflect bureaucratic
politics), it is generally acknowledged that NSA will have to adopt an altered
personnel structure.  FY2001 Intelligence Authorization legislation (passed by both
houses, but vetoed by the President because of concerns not directly related to NSA)
would provide authority for NSA to offer early retirement and voluntary separation
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pay to employees with 20 or 25 years of service (depending on age).  This provision
was inserted  to provide the NSA Director with the opportunity to institute personnel
changes that are considered necessary and reflects the intelligence committees view
that “the situation at NSA is unique, not only in the enormity of the task of
modernization, but also in the direct impact on national security should NSA
modernization fail.”13
One approach that has been adopted is to increase reliance on contracting out
personnel services although security considerations can complicate the use of non-
career personnel.14  In some cases it has been possible to acquire the services of some
retired NSA officials who are able to receive the relevant clearances with little delay.
In other situations NSA is able to compartmentalize some activities and make use of
specialists who do not need access to sensitive information.  Some observers warn,
however, that contract personnel will tend not to be as committed to the Agency’s
missions, and may work subsequently for non-government concerns with an increased
possibility of unauthorized sharing of classified information.
Charting NSA’s Future Direction
In recent years, congressional oversight committees have become concerned
about the effect of the changed international threat environment and new technologies
on NSA’s future effectiveness.  The requirement to replace aging satellite systems in
particular have placed pressures on intelligence spending across the board; the size
and extent of NSA’s budget inevitably meant that it would be subject to close
scrutiny.  Thus, in 1997 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence established a
Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to review the U.S. sigint effort along with other
technical challenges facing the Intelligence Community.  The TAG was composed of
leading U.S. scientists and experts in technology and intelligence and has made two
classified reports on NSA’s capabilities.  According to the Senate Committee, the
TAG identified serious deficiencies; “as resources have been reduced, the NSA
systematically has sacrificed infrastructure modernization in order to meet day-to-day
intelligence requirements.  Consequently, the organization begins the 21st Century
lacking the technological infrastructure and human resources needed even to maintain
the status quo, much less meet emerging challenges.”15  One media account indicates
that the TAG’s conclusions were highly critical: “`We told them that unless you
totally change your intelligence-collection systems you will go deaf,” one involved
official [stated].  “You’ve got ten years.”’ According to the account, the Group
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“urged that the agency immediately begin a major reorganization, and start planning
for the recruitment of several thousand skilled computer scientists.”16
According to the Senate report, the TAG also recommended new business
procedures and additional resources.  The report indicated that the FY2001
authorization bill would likely reflect TAG recommendations, with resources being
shifted to long-term infrastructure modernization at the expense of some short-term
collection.17
 
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also reached the
conclusion in 1998 that  “very large changes in the National Security Agency’s culture
and method of operations need to take place.”18  The Committee indicated its
approach:
First, the committee is funding and mandating external management reviews.
Second, the committee is attempting to infuse fresh thought, needed expertise
(especially in systems engineering), and greater fairness by insisting that
significant portions of certain categories be contracted out and that outside
proposals and expertise be solicited, notably in systems engineering, advanced
research and development, and in development activities....  Third, fences have
been placed on portions of the budget, with the prospect that a considerable
amount of money could be reprogrammed for other [Intelligence Community]
needs if NSA does not develop detailed strategic and business planning.19
The House committee envisioned “a far more radical revision of the budget process
than presently contemplated.”  Emphasis would be placed on “a new culture in which
all team together on a new architecture.”  
Director Hayden’s Initiatives
Aware of the challenges facing the Nation’s sigint effort and responsive to
congressional concerns, the senior leadership of NSA has been moving to make
drastic changes in NSA’s operations and organization.  Upon becoming NSA’s
director in March 1999 Air Force Lt. General V. Michael Hayden assigned a number
of mid-level NSA officials to review the Agency’s organizational structure.  Known
as the New Enterprise Team, the group recommended a new executive leadership
team, the development of strategic business plans, the acquisition of agency wide
management information systems, and hiring a financial management officer.  A
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separate report by a smaller group of outside experts with experience in the
telecommunications industry made similar recommendations.20  
The two sets of recommendations reflected a consensus by these advisory groups
(and by congressional overseers) that NSA requires more centralized management,
that separate divisions that had long enjoyed functional independence need greater
coordination to reduce duplicative functions, and that there needs to be a strategic
vision of how the Agency is to adapt to changed geopolitical and technological
environments.  Both reports reflected confidence in the importance of NSA’s
missions, but both were highly critical of NSA’s management and personnel
structures.  The outside experts concluded: “The most serious issues are leadership,
accountability, and empowerment, as evidenced by great dissatisfaction with decision
making within the Agency.”21  The NSA officials noted the Agency’s fundamental
problems: “lack of governance, lack of leadership, and lack of strategic alignment.”
Although some specific criticisms reflect the inherent limitations of government
agencies in comparison with the civilian telecommunications industry, NSA was urged
to take special steps to hold middle managers responsible for personnel decisions.
Although NSA has traditionally hired recent college graduates and retained them until
retirement, changes in technology, in the international environment, as well as
disparities in government and civilian salaries, imply that in the future there may be
fixed-term positions and upgraded salary levels for some critical technical specialists.
NSA was also urged to move away from its traditional preference for performing
all functions in-house rather than to look for creative ways to find civilian contractors
not just as sources of manpower but as “solution providers,” and to make hard
choices over priorities rather than to make across-the-board budgetary reductions.
The outside team of experts urged NSA not only to take advantage of the potential
advantages of outsourcing but also to bring in mid- and upper-level managers from
successful businesses.
In November 1999, Hayden launched “100 Days of Change”–another series of
managerial initiatives responsive to the recommendations of these groups.  He
subsequently summarized NSA’s challenges: “maintaining a strong infrastructure of
people and facilities in a time of constrained budgets; accurately forecasting
technology trends in the face of an explosion of information systems; and reacting
agilely to new technological innovations.”22  
With congressional support Hayden has brought in industry experts from civilian
firms to develop a comprehensive business plan for the Agency that will enable it to
perform in a transformed global information technology arena. An initial step was the
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appointment of a new chief financial manager from private industry in January 2000.
He has also hired a chief information officer, a senior acquisition executive, and
created a transformation office.  It is hoped that these officials will provide the
capability for strategic planning and centralized coordination that NSA has been
criticized for not maintaining.  In July 2000 it was announced that William Black, Jr.,
a former NSA official who had retired and found employment in a high-tech
consulting firm, Science Applications International Corporation, would be appointed
deputy director.  Black replaces Barbara McNamara who has been widely blamed in
some media accounts23 as part of an “old guard” that has delayed NSA’s transition to
post-Cold War challenges.  McNamara has been assigned as head of NSA’s liaison
office in London. 
In October 2000, further adjustments in NSA’s management structure were
announced.  General Hayden will serve as Director and Chief Executive Officer and
intends to focus on implementing the changes necessary to keep NSA relevant to the
needs of the rest of the Government.  Deputy Director Black will also serve as Chief
Operating Officer and be responsible for day-to-day operations.  A new Executive
Leadership Team will be created to concentrate on overall strategic planning issues,
composed of Hayden, Black, and the deputy directors for operations, information
assurance, and technology.24
In June 2000 NSA announced that it intended to contract out “non-mission
related” information technology (IT) support–information technology functions that
are not part of its core cryptologic efforts.25   A $4 billion IT contract, to be known
as Project Groundbreaker, will be awarded for handling many of the Agency’s
extensive and varied requirements for information processing including desktop and
workstation computers, email, network operations, software and telephone systems.26
Hayden indicated that NSA divisions traditionally had undertaken much of their own
IT work to support their ongoing operations, with inadequate concern for overall
financial implications for the entire Agency.  He was quoted in one account:
I knew exactly how much activity X cost.  I knew when we spent the money, I
knew what it cost, I knew when it was appropriated.  But we didn’t really have the
ability to aggregate all activity Xs and portray them to the agency as, “Hey, by the
way, do you realize that is what activity X cost you around the world and do you
really want to be spending [this] percentage of your budget on activity X as
opposed to activity Y?”  We couldn’t do that.  We couldn’t pull the thread and
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aggregate what it was we were doing as an enterprise in order to make strategic
decisions on direction.27
Hayden realizes that a more centralized system, with much work outsourced to a
civilian contractor, may result in having to say “no to legitimate daily operational
needs because the system can’t handle it.  That is the big change.”28 
On November 8, 2000 NSA announced the accomplishment of the initial phase
of its new acquisition program and indicated an intention to solicit industry for
concept studies for sigint modernization.  This initiative is known as Trailblazer and
the studies are expected to be undertaken in 2001. 
Elements of Uncertainty
Few observers deny that significant structural changes in NSA’s organization are
warranted, but some caution that the changes thus far envisioned may not resolve the
expected problems.  Skeptics note, in particular, that outsourcing is no panacea, that
it may mean the loss of experienced personnel with longstanding ties to NSA without
necessarily reducing overall costs to the taxpayers.  Further, they argue, the necessity
of granting sensitive clearances to contractor personnel may increase risks of
compromising classified information and processes.  All agree that costs of
background security investigations will increase.
Other objections may be raised concerning the consolidation of IT functions in
a centralized office.  The flexibility of individual components to design unique systems
may be jeopardized, and the NSA Director has acknowledged that certain legitimate
functions may have to be curtailed.  Observers note that many of the technological
advances in the past decade have been made by decentralized organizations that
permit component divisions to establish their own operational practices and develop
their own IT solutions without micro-management from a headquarters staff.
The External Team argued that “intelligence targets will continue to be
increasingly transnational in nature, and . . . alignment to geographical locations and
entities is obsolete.”  Although all observers would agree that NSA cannot maintain
uniform depths of area expertise for all potential concerns, some suggest that there
are areas that will be of intense concern to the U.S. Government for decades to come
and dispersing area familiarities acquired over many years would be seriously
mistaken.
Congressional observers strongly support the use of NSA’s budget to establish
priorities.  They do not indicate that they believe NSA has mishandled funds; they do
maintain that the Agency has not managed its budget to achieve managerial goals.  In
1999 the House Intelligence Committee noted that “In the last two Congresses, the
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committee has been direct in its identification of process and management problems
that required attention,” but “NSA management has not yet stepped up to the line.”
The committee added that it “looks forward to the opportunities for change that
present themselves with the introduction of a new Director of NSA.”29 
The Senate Intelligence Committee has urged that the NSA Director should have
greater authority over the 70% of cryptologic resources that are currently managed
by the military services.  The military services operate collection sites, undertake
initial analysis, and provide direct support to military commanders. NSA is responsible
for tasking their efforts and for final analysis of the data they collect.  Since service
cryptologic elements support both NSA and military commanders there are inevitably
differences over their disposition and responsibilities. Although the Senate Intelligence
Committee advocates the NSA Director have “centralized direction across the
SIGINT infrastructure as he implements his modernization strategy,”30 some in DOD
(and perhaps in Congress as well) would argue, however, that the need to configure
sigint resources in direct support of operational commanders would argue against
such augmented authorities for the leader of a Washington-area agency.
The House Committee, in reporting its version of the FY2001 Intelligence
Authorization Act in May 2000 (H.R. 4392), accepted the need for managerial
changes at NSA.  Criticizing the traditional independence of NSA’s divisions, the
Committee argued that:
Each type of communication–radio, satellite, microwave, cellular, cable–is
becoming connected to all the others.  Each new type of traffic shows up on every
type of communication.  Unfortunately, as the global network has become more
integrated, NSA’s culture has evolved so that is seemingly incapable of responding
in an integrated fashion.
The House Committee argued that NSA must, as a result, “prepare itself for complex,
prioritized, carefully timed and integrated systems acquisitions that, in aggregate, rival
the complexity of programs commonly managed by the NRO, the Defense
Department, and commercial industry.”31  
The House Intelligence Committee’s  recommendations for significant shifts in
NSA’s budget have not yet been accepted.  DOD urged that the changes not be
approved pending a review of the results of Hayden’s initial reorganization efforts.32
In particular, DOD, with support by the Senate Armed Services Committee, views
with concern any efforts to give the DCI influence over NSA that would detract from
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that of the Secretary of Defense.  These separate approaches may not easily be
reconciled.
A major issue related to sigint in the post-Cold War environment is the erosion
of distinctions between foreign and domestic threats.  For example, an attack from
outside the borders of the country through cyberspace could result in major damage
to U.S. institutions, but responsibilities for monitoring potential threats are complex
and in some ways ill-defined.  Constitutional principles and statutes sharply distinguish
between information gathering by foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement
agencies and efforts to involve NSA in surveillance of U.S. persons have been sharply
restricted.  Various administrative arrangements have been made to facilitate
cooperation between NSA and the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in
gathering information on threats with both foreign and domestic components, but
many uncertainties remain.  Many observers strongly oppose the use in court cases
of information derived from sigint provided by NSA at the same time, sigint specialists
are highly reluctant to see NSA diverted from its foreign intelligence missions to tasks
that may risk involvement in domestic controversies.  Congress, included in the
FY20001 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 4392, section 606) a requirement for
a report from the Attorney General regarding actions taken in regard to the
dissemination of intelligence information within the Justice Department.  (This
provision replaced an earlier version that would have required the establishment of
procedures to accomplish this dissemination.)33
NSA and counterpart agencies in a number of other countries, especially Great
Britain, have come under much criticism in the European Parliament for allegedly
monitoring private communications of non-U.S. businessmen in a coordinated
electronic surveillance effort known as Echelon in order to support domestic
corporations.  Some critics go further and charge that NSA’s activities represent a
constant threat to civil liberties of foreigners and U.S. persons as well.  Though NSA
has reassured congressional oversight committees that the Agency complies strictly
with U.S. law, these controversies will undoubtedly continue.34
Conclusion
The National Security Act establishes sigint as a recognized function of the U.S.
Government and requires that it is usually to be carried out by NSA.  The U.S.
Government thus has accepted responsibility for electronic surveillance activities that
are condemned (but not necessarily eschewed) by some foreign countries.  Although
some specialists in international law argue that electronic surveillance is inherently
illegal, U.S. officials contend, based on constitutional responsibilities, statutes, and
long-established practice, that electronic surveillance related to national security and
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preventing terrorism and international narcotics smuggling is a legitimate function of
the U.S. government.  Unlike some foreign countries, the U.S. has not asserted a right
to conduct electronic surveillance to support its “economic well-being.”  
Managing this effort in a changing geopolitical and technological environment,
according to knowledgeable observers and congressional overseers, requires that
NSA’s organization and operations be substantially altered.  This process is currently
underway to strengthen the NSA Director’s role in managing the Agency, but many
uncertainties remain that will determine NSA’s future.  No national security official
can confidently predict what collection priorities will exist in five years time, nor can
the equipment acquisition priorities be firmly projected very far into the future.  With
congressional encouragement, the current leadership of NSA is drawing increasingly
on talent available in the civilian community to offset the difficulties involved in
retaining talented technological experts in a very tight sector of the labor market.
This effort may not result in the stable, loyal workforce that, in the past, led to NSA’s
gradual successes against Cold War targets.  Some observers also believe that NSA
will ultimately require significant budgetary increases at a time when there is a
determination to restrict overall government spending.  
The future success of NSA is by no means guaranteed. The current NSA
Director’s managerial initiatives and the move to use outside contractors have
widespread support, but these efforts may not achieve all their intended goals.  NSA
may not be adaptable to radically changing developments in international
telecommunications and the bewildering emergence of terrorist groups previously
unheard of.  The wider public may come to view NSA’s activities as inherent threats
to privacy that outweigh the value of information acquired.  Attention will be paid to
the costs and benefits of allocating additional funds to NSA at a time when there are
sure to be competing demands.  
The current level of congressional concern with NSA is unlikely to diminish.
Observers expect that, in the face of attacks on NSA by some in the media and by a
number of European parliamentarians, members of Congress will be asked to defend
or criticize not only NSA’s operations, but also its statutory roles and missions.
Funding for NSA’s efforts to adapt to altered geopolitical and technological
environments will have to be balanced against other competing needs.  To a much
greater extent than in the past, observers expect that Congress will continue to
involve itself in internal changes in the Agency designed to acquire technological
capabilities to acquire information at a time when the volume of communications is
expanding exponentially, and access is greatly complicated by the spread of
sophisticated encryption systems.
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Appendix A. Congressional Oversight of NSA:
A Brief Review
Codemaking and signals intelligence (sigint) have long been functions of
governments and military organizations.35  Although the United States gave less
attention to codemaking and codebreaking than the major European powers, U.S.
forces during World War I established a fairly extensive military sigint effort.  In the
1920s and 1930s, the services maintained a small sigint effort and, for a time, the
State Department collaborated with the Army in operating an American “Black
Chamber” that attempted, with limited success, to intercept and decrypt foreign
diplomatic communications.  By the time the United States entered World War II,
U.S. codebreakers were able to decrypt some codes of Japan, Germany, and other
foreign countries.  Success in breaking Japanese diplomatic codes, achieved through
“the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness”was acknowledged
publicly after the end of the war in the congressional report regarding the attack on
Pearl Harbor.36  
During the course of World War II, sigint efforts proved to be exceptionally
valuable especially in regard to acquiring military information.  The crucial victory at
Midway in June 1942 that halted Japan’s advance in the Pacific was gained through
sigint.   The Allies’ ability to keep supplies flowing across the North Atlantic
depended on limiting U-boat attacks; this too was accomplished through good  sigint.
Some observers have concluded that sigint enabled the Allies to end the war at least
a year earlier than would otherwise have been possible.  
During World War II, cooperation with the British in sigint collection and
analysis proved very fruitful.  Although both countries were initially reluctant to share
their codebreaking secrets, they gradually came to appreciate the advantages of
sharing both collection and analysis.  Anglo-American cooperation did not end with
the conclusion of hostilities in 1945, but actually expanded with the beginning of the
Cold War and the expansion of U.S. security interests throughout the world.  The
relationship with the British would eventually encompass the Canadians, Australians,
and, to a lesser extent, the New Zealanders.
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After the War, the Army and the Navy, and subsequently the newly independent
Air Force all continued sigint collection.  An effort was made to coordinate the
services’ sigint efforts in a single organization known as the Armed Forces Security
Agency established by the Secretary of Defense in 1949.  Coordination problems were
not, however, resolved until October 1952 when President Truman established the
National Security Agency in an effort to provide a more effective structure for
coordinating signals intelligence activities.  Truman had determined that the sigint
function was “national,” that it would serve civilian policymakers in the State
Department and the White House as well as the military.  This action was taken in a
secret memorandum that was not made public at the time.
NSA became the U.S. focal point of a global sigint effort.  Signals are collected
at field stations throughout the world, most of which operated by the military services.
Some initial processing and analysis may have be performed at the collection site, but
in general the “take” is forwarded to NSA, which moved its headquarters from
Arlington, Virginia to Fort Meade, Maryland in 1957.  After decryption and analysis,
the resultant data is provided to “all-source” intelligence agencies such as the CIA or
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  NSA has always been staffed by a
combination of civil servants and active duty military personnel, but the Agency also
provides operational guidance to sigint collection stations maintained by the
cryptologic elements of the military services (collectively described as the Central
Security Service (CSS)).
During the Cold War, NSA’s operations, along with those of allied countries)
were primarily directed at the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and Communist
China.  Massive efforts were made to collect sigint dealing with military threats to the
U.S. and its allies.  In addition to sigint provided to national-level decision makers,
tactical sigint collection, analysis and reporting was incorporated in military
operations, including those occurring in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
For many years NSA’s efforts did not receive much public scrutiny.
Congressional oversight was conducted by small sub-committees of armed services
and appropriations committees without public hearings.  The first major legislation
dealing directly with NSA was the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (P.L. 86-
36).  This Act did not describe the functions of NSA, but dealt with “housekeeping”
matters such as pay and allowances, training, property acquisition, and leasing,   It
exempted NSA from the requirement to provide detailed information regarding
organizational and functional matters to the Civil Service Commission (the
predecessor of the Office of Personnel Management).  These authorities are, in
general, similar to those exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in
regard to the CIA.  The act has been amended from time to time and serves as the
statutory basis for NSA’s personnel policies that derive from its unique mission,
including special pay and allowances for overseas travel, professional and foreign
language training, and property leasing, and use of the NSA.
An exception to the practice of congressional reticence regarding NSA was a
report on a widely publicized defection in 1960 of two NSA employees to the Soviet
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Union.37  The committee criticized personnel security procedures as shockingly lax
and in part as a result of congressional criticism of the handling of the Mitchell/Martin
case DOD tightened the security practices at NSA to ensure that background
investigations were completed prior to granting access to cryptologic materials.  In
1964 P.L. 88-290 (known as Title III of the Internal Security Act of 1950) was
enacted to establish requirements for security investigations for persons working at
NSA. Observers note that it was an early reflection of the importance of congressional
oversight.  It gave the NSA Director authority to terminate the employment of NSA
personnel “whenever he considers that action to be in the best interest of the United
States.”  Such actions can be taken notwithstanding usual civil service procedures for
personnel actions.  In 1996 these provisions were superseded by enactment of the
FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201, sections 1631-1635)
which established intelligence personnel policies for the entire Defense Department,
including authority to terminate employees “in the interests of the United States.”
Appeals of decisions to terminate can only be made to the Secretary of Defense.38
In the mid-1970s, public concerns that U.S. intelligence agencies were spying on
domestic groups opposed to the Vietnam War led to hearings by select committees
in both chambers.39  Interest in  NSA centered on “watch lists” that had been
maintained to collect communications of U.S. citizens who were suspected of ties to
hostile foreign countries and groups.40  There was also interest in a project, known as
Shamrock, by which copies of international telegrams were provided to NSA on a
daily basis by three telegraph companies. These practices had been terminated by the
early 1970's, but Members of Congress considered that the Agency should be held
accountable for them.41  (The desire to bring such practices under the constraints of
statutory law contributed to passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.)
During the hearings conducted by the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (known as the
Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church), for the first time a
Director of NSA testified in open session to give a public overview of NSA’s
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responsibilities.  Lt. General Lew Allen, Jr., citing the statutory and other authorities
under which NSA carried out its responsibilities, stated: 
This mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence, obtained from foreign
electrical communications and also from other foreign signals such as radars.
Signals are intercepted by many techniques and processed, sorted and analyzed by
procedures which reject inappropriate or unnecessary signals.   The foreign
intelligence derived from these signals is then reported to various agencies of the
government in response to their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.42
Allen also explained in some detail the practice of establishing “watch lists” by which
“words, including individual names, subjects, locations, etc.” could be identified
within a stream of communications to separate useful information from the vast
quantities of chatter.  Particular attention was paid to retrieving information relating
to terrorism, narcotics, and–a particular concern of the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations–foreign influences on domestic groups suspected of fomenting civil
disturbances in the U.S. in protest against the U.S. role in the Vietnam war.
Allen indicated that, pursuant to presidential direction, the Secretary of Defense
had established NSA in accordance with his statutory authorities. He noted further
that “for the past 22 years [i.e., since circa 1953], Congress has annually appropriated
funds for the operation of the NSA, following hearings before the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress in which extensive briefings
of the NSA’s signals intelligence mission have been conducted.”43  
The Church Committee concluded:
The National Security Agency is one of the largest and most technically
oriented components of the United States intelligence community.  Its basic
function is collecting and processing foreign communications and signals for
intelligence purposes. NSA is also responsible for creating and supervising the
cryptography of all United States Government agencies, and has a special
responsibility for supervising the military services’ cryptologic agencies. Another
major responsibility is protecting the security of American communications.
The Committee regards these functions as vital to American security.  NSA’s
capability to perform these functions must be preserved.  The Committee notes
that despite the fact that NSA has been in existence for several decades, NSA still
lacks a legislative charter.  Moreover, in its extensive investigation, the Committee
has identified intelligence community abuses in levying requirements on NSA and
abuses by NSA itself in carrying out its functions.  These abuses are detailed in
the domestic portion of the Committee report.  The Committee finds that there is
a compelling need for an NSA charter to spell out limitations which will protect
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individual constitutional rights without impairing NSA’s necessary foreign
intelligence mission.44
Thus, even a committee widely perceived as antagonistic to intelligence agencies
concluded that NSA’s sigint mission is “vital to American security.”  It urged,
however, a better statutory framework for the Agency and an enhanced role for
congressional oversight to ensure that NSA was not misused in ways that would
undermine American liberties.  
The complete final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (known
as the Pike Committee) was never made public, but its published recommendations
also included a proposal that the existence of NSA be recognized by specific
legislation, that such legislation provide for civilian control of NSA, and that the role
of NSA with reference to the monitoring of communications of Americans be
defined.45
Many of the most important statutory provisions relating to NSA were enacted
in the wake of these congressional investigations.  Congress passed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) (50 USC 1801) which establishes
procedures for electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes.46  It provides that the Attorney General may authorize surveillance in
situations wherein the target is communications of foreign powers; in cases in which
communications of U.S. persons might be acquired, then approval of a court, created
pursuant to the FISA, would be required.  Information acquired in accordance with
FISA provisions is to be used for foreign intelligence purposes (even though in recent
years Congress has expanded FISA to permit use of some types of information
acquired under its provisions to be used for law enforcement purposes in certain
circumstances).  FISA, in essence, ensures that foreign intelligence electronic
surveillance operations within the United States are conducted in accordance with
statutory authorities and with supervision by the Justice Department (and with
oversight by Congress).  
Although in the Pearl Harbor investigations, the U.S. Government officially
revealed its prewar sigint efforts, ongoing sigint activities had not been acknowledged.
FISA provided authority in U.S. statutory law for electronic surveillance activities to
be conducted for foreign intelligence (rather than law enforcement) purposes.  In
enacting the statute the United States Government accepted responsibility for NSA’s
activities no matter how they might be regarded in other countries.  FISA does of
course provide ample warning to foreign countries and foreign groups that the U.S.
undertakes electronic surveillance when it perceives it necessary.  While the argument
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was made that such activities are best undertaken without formal legal authorization
and without the Government’s accepting responsibility for them, Congress specifically
rejected that argument in the belief that intelligence activities, including electronic
surveillance, are necessary to protect the national security and that the U.S.
Intelligence Community should be subject to law and to oversight by Congress.  
In addition to FISA, there were also efforts to establish a “legislative charter” for
the agencies of the Intelligence Community, including NSA. Testifying in February
1980, the then Director of NSA, Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman, supported charter
legislation, noting that “while the Agency has been provided with significant
Congressional guidance and protection with respect to the information and products
produced by the Agency, there was little Congressional guidance on the functions and
responsibilities of the Agency and few Congressionally provided statutory tools to be
used to perform those functions.”47  Charter legislation for the entire Intelligence
Community became very complex and ultimately was a victim of partisan disputes in
the late 1970s.48 It was not until 1992 that the National Security Act was amended to
provide a functional charter for NSA.49  The Act now gives the Secretary of Defense
the responsibility to ensure:
through the National Security Agency (except as otherwise directed by the
President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective
unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall
ensure that the product is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized
recipients....
Guidance for NSA’s activities has been further detailed in a series of executive
orders.50   E.O. 12333, signed by President Reagan on December 4, 1981 after
extensive consultation with Congress, and still in effect, tasks the Secretary of
Defense with responsibilities for NSA including:
(1) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals
intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain
operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence
Community.  No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence
activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense; 
(2) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including
assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as
required for the direct support of military commanders;
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(3) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence
purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(4) Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes
in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign
intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the
military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(6) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for
counterintelligence purposes;
(7) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations
in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the
Secretary of Defense.  If provisions of such support requires use of national
collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the
Director of Central Intelligence.
(8) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent
for the communications security of the United States Government;
(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United  States
for signals intelligence and communications security;
(10) Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information,
and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants,
employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA
as are necessary;
(11) Prescribing, within its field or authorized operations, security regulations
covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution
of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the
elements under control of the Director of NSA, and exercising the necessary
supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations;
(12) Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for
intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the
Director of Central Intelligence; and
(13) Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within and
outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in
sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.
As noted above, in 1976 the Pike Committee urged civilian leadership for NSA.
 NSA has always been headed by military officers, but they have served under the
direction of both the civilian Secretary of Defense and the (usually) civilian Director
of Central Intelligence.  In accordance with subsequent amendments to the National
Security Act, Directors of NSA are now appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DCI
(although a recommendation can be submitted without the DCI’s concurrence if the
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fact of non-concurrence is stated). In recent years, few observers express concerns
about the NSA Director being a serving officer.
The amended National Security Act also provides that the DCI develops budgets
for the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program which includes NSA.  The DCI
also establishes the requirements and priorities that govern the collection of national
intelligence.  These provisions provide authority for the DCI to oversee NSA’s budget
and operations. There are, however, multiple occasions for differences between the
roles of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.   The Defense Secretary is inevitably
more focused on aligning NSA closely with the operating forces of DOD and tends
to emphasize collection of direct interest to military commanders.  The DCI, for his
part, tends to see NSA as one component of an interagency effort to gather
intelligence for senior policymakers in Washington; he approves collection and
analysis priorities that reflect their requirements.  These respective responsibilities are
well understood; defense and intelligence staffs attempt to make adjustments to
accommodate differing requirements within budgetary constraints.  Any major
reorganization or redirection of efforts, however, that could affect NSA’s ability to
support either national policymakers or military commanders would be sure to
generate criticism from one quarter or another.
The Pike and Church Committees also laid the groundwork for permanent
intelligence committees.  Subsequent to the establishment of the committees (the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence) in 1976-1977, Members and staff have regularly reviewed NSA
programs and adjusted budgetary priorities with almost all hearings being conducted
in closed sessions.  NSA spending (along with the cryptologic activities of the services
and other agencies) is authorized in annual intelligence authorization laws with
funding levels indicated only in classified annexes.  The two armed services
committees also have oversight of most intelligence programs since they involved
Defense Department assets.
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Appendix B. Cooperation with Other Countries and the
Echelon Controversy51
Although sigint collection and analysis are among the most sensitive activities
undertaken by the U.S. Government, close cooperation in these efforts is maintained
with several other countries–principally, but not limited to, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  These relationships began during the Second
World War when agreements to share signals intelligence were made between the
military services of the United States and Great Britain, with separate arrangements
made with other Commonwealth countries. This cooperation was widely considered
by senior military leaders at the time, and by historians subsequently, with having
significantly reduced the amount of time needed to defeat Nazi Germany and Japan
as well as the number of Allied casualties.  Although both the United States and Great
Britain tackled various communications links of the Japanese and Germans (along
with those of other countries), arrangements were worked out whereby the American
effort was concentrated on the Japanese and the British on the Germans.  The division
of labor reflected resource limitations–especially among skilled cryptologists–and
possession of geographical sites from which enemy transmissions could be
intercepted.
With the end of hostilities in 1945, both British and American intelligence
officials were reluctant to terminate a highly productive cooperative arrangement.
There was continued military cooperation between the two countries in occupation
duties in various areas and, when the Soviet Union began to be considered a threat
to both countries, intelligence cooperation continued.  Cooperation with Canada was
considered essential in view of potential Soviet military activities originating in Arctic
regions. Formal arrangements to cooperate in collecting and analyzing sigint were
made by the two countries (and others) given shared geostrategic interests and limited
resources that did not permit expansive unilateral efforts.  These agreements were
conducted in great secrecy at the time and remain largely classified a half-century
later.52  
The sigint relationship with the British and other Commonwealth countries has
attracted criticism from a number of sources over the years.53  To an extent a close
intelligence relationships arguably predispose military and political leaders to
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coordinated policies. Some observers object to international agreements made without
the formal advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.  The secret relationships have been
criticized by observers in the U.S., Britain, Australia and elsewhere who oppose
international entanglements.  Some observers from European Union countries express
concern that sigint cooperation among the “Anglo-Saxons” might work against their
own economic interests.
Supporters of the such relationships with other countries point to the advantages
in shared efforts that conserve intelligence resources.  The United States, Britain,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand often have common policies on important
international issues, but the existence of close intelligence ties has not precluded
different policies (or even, as at Suez in 1956, opposing policies) when national
leaders felt them necessary.   In the post-Cold War environment, observers believe
that sigint cooperation with a number of friendly countries maximizes opportunities
to obtain information regarding disparate regional threats from terrorist groups,
narcotics traffickers, and dealers in nuclear and other substances used in making
weapons of mass destruction.  
NSA has long been the target of criticism from those who view intelligence
agencies as inevitable threats to civil liberties.  In general, however, the Agency’s low
public profile and the esoteric nature of its work attracted less attention than the more
dramatic covert actions undertaken by the CIA.  In the past few years, however,
reports prepared under the auspices of the Directorate-General for Research of the
European Parliament have described U.S. electronic surveillance efforts.  The studies,
known as Scientific and Technological Options Assessments (STOA), are prepared
by contractors and not by European Parliament’s official staff.  A series of these
reports have severely criticized NSA, charging it with working together with sigint
organizations of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to gather
commercial communications and providing the intercepts to U.S. business interests
to give them advantages over foreign firms.54  
The criticisms of NSA by these reports have been echoed by media commentary.
One account claims that 
It is the new Cold War.  The United States intelligence agencies, facing downsizing
after the fall of the Berlin wall, have found themselves a new role spying on
foreign firms to help American business in global markets.
Echelon is part of a British and American-run world-wide spy system that can
“suck up” phone calls, faxes and e-mails sent by satellite. America’s intelligence
agencies have been able to intercept these vital private communications, often




its Oldest Friend–the Dollar,” Independent (London), July 2, 2000.  Campbell and Lashmar
detail instances in which the U.S. Government complained to foreign countries that European
firms were attempting to bribe their officials and, as a result, the contracts ultimately went to
U.S. firms.  They quote others as maintaining that U.S. officials pass intelligence information
directly to U.S. corporations.
56 See Jeffrey Richelson, “Desperately Seeking Signals,”Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
March/April 2000.
57 “With respect to allegations of industrial espionage, the notion that we collect intelligence
to promote American business interests is simply wrong.  We do not to [sic] target foreign
companies to support American business interests.”  Federal News Service, Prepared
Testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Before the House Committee
on Intelligence, April 12, 2000, p. 4.
58 Federal News Service, Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
April 12, 2000, p. 33.
59 There is no provision in U.S. law for foreign intelligence agencies to assist U.S. firms and
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Some media accounts state that this entire cooperative endeavor has the codename
Project Echelon; others believe that Echelon refers only to the process by which
computers operated by cooperating sigint agencies sift through many thousands of
intercepts for ones containing pre-programmed key words.56
U.S. intelligence officials have responded to these charges by describing the
statutory framework under which NSA operates and the oversight mechanisms in
place in both the Executive and Legislative Branches.  There have been categorical
denials that intelligence is passed to U.S. companies to provide them commercial
advantages although it is freely acknowledged that sigint is used to provide the U.S.
Government with information about bribery and other illegal practices of foreign firms
and that this information has been used as the basis for diplomatic complaints.57 
NSA has successfully persuaded the congressional leadership that it faithfully and
responsibly conducts its electronic surveillance activities in accordance with law and
relevant executive orders.  Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
FY2000 (P.L. 106-120) required that the Director of NSA submit a report (to be
prepared jointly by the Director of NSA, the DCI, and the Attorney General)
providing a detailed analysis of the legal standards used in conducting signals
intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance.  The report was submitted in
February 2000 and set forth the legal bases for NSA’s activities, emphasizing its
commitment to respect the  privacy rights of U.S. persons.  In a public hearing to
discuss the report, Representative Goss, Chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, concluded that “our safeguards are in place and are working.”58
Most U.S. observers give credence to the official U.S. position, especially given
the absence of evidence that U.S. companies are pressuring the Government for help
in learning about foreign technologies.  Observers suggest, in addition, that any U.S.
intelligence assistance to a U.S. firm in winning a foreign contract would provoke
strong criticism by a disadvantaged U.S. competitor.59  Former DCI R. James
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there are important privacy protections mandated by FISA.  On the other hand, Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights recognizes a right of privacy that is not to be
interfered with except as is necessary in “the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country.” (Emphasis added.)  The full implications of this
provision are uncertain, but it would not necessarily preclude the interception of
communications by intelligence agencies to obtain commercial advantages for their country’s
businesses.
60 R. James Woolsey, “Why We Spy on Our Allies,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2000.
61 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “GCHQ Faces Inquiry over US ̀ Spying’ on Europe,” Electronic
Telegraph, July 6, 2000.
Woolsey has maintained that U.S. intelligence agencies do not collect information
about foreign technology because American technology is, in general, far superior.
There is, however, he argues, a real need to seek information about corrupt practices
by foreign competitors and activities such as transfers of dual-use technologies for use
in production of weapons of mass destruction as well as activities in countries subject
to U.N. sanctions.60
Some foreign observers continue to dispute U.S. claims and they will not easily
be persuaded that their concerns are ill-founded.  Suggestions of NSA electronic
eavesdropping have clearly had resonance among members of the European
Parliament which voted on July 5, 2000 to undertake a lengthy investigation of
Echelon.  The investigation will not include the calling of witnesses and, interestingly,
an amendment calling for an investigation of eavesdropping by all EU governments
was not adopted.61  In part, foreign objections stem from concern about the
capabilities of NSA to monitor their communications and those of European
companies.  There is also, especially among some, irritation that the United States has
a closer sigint relationship with some of its allies than with others.  In part, however,
observers perceive attacks on NSA’s activities as instinctive hostility among political
elements long skeptical of close U.S.-European relations and determined to forge a
more independent European identity.  Some objections also  undoubtedly arise from
deep-seated opposition to the work of all intelligence agencies.
There is no question that the worldwide capabilities of NSA cause suspicion and
resentment among some foreign elements.  U.S. officials justify NSA’s activities on
international law, the necessity to acquire information about threats to national
security, international terrorism, and the narcotics trade. While the potential for abuse
is acknowledged, the United States has a legal structure that regulates electronic
surveillance.  In addition, intelligence derived from sigint supports many collective
military and diplomatic efforts with European and other allies.
